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How should we understand the nature of patients’ right in public health care systems? Are
health care rights different to rights under a private contract for car insurance? This article
distinguishes between public and private rights and the relevance of community interests
and  notions of social solidarity. It discusses the distinction between political and civil rights,
and  social and economic rights and the inherently political and redistributive nature of the
latter.  Nevertheless, social and economic rights certainly give rise to “rights” enforceable by
the  courts. In the UK (as in many other jurisdictions), the courts have favoured a “procedural”
approach to the question, in which the courts closely scrutinise decisions and demand high
standards of rationality from decision-makers. However, although this is the general rule,
the  article also discusses a number of exceptional cases where “substantive” remedies are
available which guarantee patients access to the care they need.
©  2014 Escola Nacional de Saúde Pública. Published by Elsevier España, S.L.U. All rights
reserved.
Os  direitos  em  saúde  e  a  racionalizac¸ão  no  Sistema  Nacional  de  Saúde
Inglês  (NHS):  da  teoria  à  prática
alavras-chave:
ireitos públicos
oluc¸ões jurídicas Procedimentais
oluc¸ões jurídicas substantivas
r  e  s  u  m  o
Como compreender a natureza dos direitos dos doentes nos sistemas de saúde públicos?
São  os direitos em saúde diferentes dos direitos que são objeto de contratos privados de
seguro automóvel? Este artigo distingue direitos públicos e direitos privados, bem como
relevância do interesse comum e noc¸ões de solidariedade social. Este artigo discute tam-
bém a distinc¸ão entre direitos civis e políticos por um lado e direitos económicos e sociais por
outro, sublinhando a natureza inerentemente política e redistributiva destes últimos. Ape-s direitos económicos e sociais estão também na origem de “direitos”sar  desta natureza, opassíveis de serem feitos cumprir pelos tribunais. No Reino Unido (como em muitas outras
ordens jurídicas) os tribunais têm favorecido uma soluc¸ão jurídica “procedimental” para
as  questões aqui suscitadas, escrutinando de muito perto os decisores e exigindo-lhes
elevados padrões de racionalidade nas suas decisões. Todavia, apesar de esta ser a regra
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geral, discutem-se também neste artigo alguns casos de excec¸ão onde soluc¸ões jurídicas
“substantivas” foram adoptadas, garantindo aos pacientes, por essa via, o acesso aos cuida-
dos  de saúde de que necessitam.
©  2014 Escola Nacional de Saúde Pública. Publicado por Elsevier España, S.L.U. Todos os
direitos reservados.The National Health Service (NHS) in Englanda works
within a ﬁnite budget allocated to some 200 health author-
ities. State funding of the NHS matches the average of most
European health care systems and is raised from general taxa-
tion (rather than insurance premiums paid to regulated health
purchasers). As in any national system, the cost of the care
we demand exceeds the resources we are willing to devote
to health care. To some extent, therefore, in a tax-funded (or
“Beveridgean” system) like the NHS, this is an electoral issue
which reﬂects democratic choices about national spending
priorities and taxation policy. This means that hard choices are
required between competing demands for treatment because
decisions to invest in some types of patients (e.g. children or
elderly care), or treatments (e.g. CTC scanners or medicines),
or diseases (e.g. cancer or mental illness) impose “opportu-
nity costs.” Working within a ﬁnite budget, decisions to invest
funds in one way preclude the opportunity for those funds
being used another way. Public welfare austerity means that
the mismatch between demand and supply is likely to become
more severe and the consequences of opportunity cost more
contentious. Once we  acknowledge this challenge, it is legiti-
mate to ask about the nature of “rights” to ﬁnite health care
resources.
To do so, we  should note the signiﬁcance of public health
care systems established to beneﬁt the community as a whole
and which are based on the principle of equal access for equal
need. This is the principle of social solidarity so applauded
throughout Europe, but viewed with suspicion by many  in the
US.b 1 In the US, political and economic success has arisen
from a belief in the value of individual autonomy and a distrust
of government (born of failing European governments from
which earlier generations ﬂed). Public welfare of this nature
is sometimes referred to as “socialised” medicine, as if it is
a social and political malaise. This difference is compounded
when one considers that health care in the US has not gen-
erally been supported by a “system,” but rather on individual
contracts of insurance with health care insurers. From that
perspective it is akin to my  motor insurance contract with the
insurer of my  car. If I am involved in an accident which is cov-
ered by my  insurance contract, I expect my insurer to pay my
compensation in full because the matter is subject to the rights
contained in a private agreement. I do not expect to hear that
my claim has been reduced because of the competing needs
of other motorists.
a The health care systems of the four nations of the UK (England,
Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales) have been devolved to each
of  their jurisdictions.
b Contrasting these two perspectives, see Callahan and Wasana,
2006.1There are different perceptions on either side of the
Atlantic. In Europe, we  do not agree that government is a nec-
essary evil which should be restrained so far as possible to
guard against the risk of enfeebling and undermining individ-
ual dynamism, initiative and self-reliance. We place greater
faith in the beneﬁts of standing together in respect of social
welfare and this is the motivation for the ideas discussed here.
I discuss (A) concepts of health care rights, and then (B) how
those concepts have been turned into practice in the NHS.
A.  Health  care  rights  –  the  concepts
How should we  conceptualise health care rights? Before tur-
ning to the NHS in particular, we  examine some of the
concepts which underlie rights of access to care arising within
the NHS. We discuss the differences between (1) private and
public rights, (2) negative and positive rights and (3) substan-
tive and procedural rights.
Rights  –  private,  or  public?
We referred above to two different forms of legal rights when
we compared my  relationship to my  motor insurer and to
the NHS. If my  rights are perceived to be essentially private
legal entitlements (like my  car insurance contract), then they
should be immune from interference from others. I have a
right to secure damages for my  injury, or access to private
health care irrespective of the rights of others. The matter
arises simply between me and the other party. My legal rela-
tionship with my  motor insurer is based on the terms agreed
between us. The rights and obligations arise between two
parties alone. Consequently, my  claim against the insurance
company arises in private law. Public interests are not engaged.
If I am entitled to compensation, my  claim rests on its own
merits. The company must organise its business so that it
can meet the legitimate claims of those it insures in full in
accordance with its contractual obligations.
By contrast, my  rights in the NHS arise in public law.
Although patients have a distinct and enforceable “right,” it
must be understood in a different way. I have no contrac-
tual relationship with the NHS. I pay no insurance premium
and my  entitlement to health care arises from a statute. My
entitlements are not detailed in a speciﬁc list of treatments.
Instead, the NHS has a duty to all those ordinarily resident
in the UK to “promote a comprehensive health service.”2 All
citizens have equal (if non-speciﬁc) rights to NHS care. In
this sense, although ﬁnite resources constrain private com-
panies and public authorities alike, the duty of the NHS is
different. The rights and duties are not agreed by the parties,
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vision which is not a mere  sham, capable of ensuring that the
system treats people fairly, equally and consistently? Proce-
dural rights offer a way of both giving “rights” appropriater e v p o r t s a ú d e p ú b l 
ut imposed on public authorities by statute. The duties so
mposed are owed not simply to individuals whose interests
re separate and severable from others, but to the commu-
ity as a whole. Thus, in deciding how to accommodate the
arious claims made upon its ﬁnite budget, the authority is
uty-bound to bear in mind the opportunity costs that arise
n investing in one group of patients in preference to another.
o this extent, its duties give rise to a different category of pub-
ic rights. Claims arising in respect of health care entitlements
re not made in Contract, but the law of judicial review. The
emedy is not compensation, nor is it that the court should
ake the decision on behalf of the public authority because
hat statutory duty has been imposed on the public authority.
nstead, the court’s powers in these cases are normally to order
hat the public authority take the decision again and perform
ts duties properly.
ights  –  negative,  or  positive?
his is explained by the further distinction between negative
nd positive rights. In principle, “negative” rights are rights to
e let alone; to be free from unwarranted interference. Nega-
ive rights protect freedom of speech, freedom of association
nd religion. They are often described as civil and political
ights which include democratic rights to free and fair elec-
ions. Negative rights are not “absolute”, are often intangible,
nd circumscribe the power of the state (except in connection
ith things like torture and inhuman treatment), but there is a
trong presumption that they should not be restricted without
ood reason, the burden of proof being on the government to
emonstrate good reason why the right should be restricted
n some way.
By contrast, positive rights embrace rights against the state,
.e. to social welfare, health care and housing. Positive rights
re referred to as social and economic rights, not to freedom
rom interference, but to some tangible beneﬁt, and depend on
he state having a system of taxation from which beneﬁts are
ayable. Clearly, the distinction is far from simple. For exam-
le, the right to be let alone does not mean that negative rights
re “free” and positive rights are costly. Negative rights involve
onsiderable ﬁnancial expenditure, for example to support the
hree branches of government. Also, the right to be let alone
s complex. Free speech guarantees a free press, but the con-
equence for individuals may be considerable intrusion into
rivate life in which we are not “let alone” at all. Note too that
y negative right to be let alone by the state may also trigger a
ositive duty on the state to protect me  if it knows I am at risk
f danger from, for example, an unsafe system in the NHS, or
 dangerous person. In these circumstances, it is placed under
 positive duty to afford me  suitable protection.
Undoubtedly, the positive/negative rights distinction can
e messy, but it is coherent to this extent: public welfare
ntitlements cannot carry the same presumption of enforce-
ent as rights to be let alone because they involve a different
imension of social and economic commitment. In respect
f health care, for example, rights to informed consent and
atient conﬁdentiality can be conceived as negative rights
nforceable by all equally. By contrast, rights of access to NHS
reatment depend on funding decisions by the Treasury, the 0 1 4;3 2(2):151–157 153
Department of Health and local health commissioners. Within
ﬁnite budgets, the extent to which we  recognise one type
of claim inevitably affects the resources available for others.
Whereas negative rights should normally be recognised by the
courts as substantive rights to the “thing” itself (e.g. freedom
of the press), my  positive rights to an enhanced pension, bet-
ter public housing or expensive medical treatment inevitably
impact upon the rights of other citizens. Entitlements of this
nature are often mediated through parliament, rather than
the courts, because they engage issues of distributive ethics
and politics. At best, then, the difference between positive and
negative rights is sometimes blurred and may be better under-
stood on a spectrum rather than as black and white. Despite
these misgivings, the potential for social and economic rights
to impact on particular segments of society, and the greater
difﬁculty of knowing whether judges are appropriate arbiters,
merits the distinction when we discuss rights to social welfare,
especially where signiﬁcant opportunity costs are involved.
Precisely this point is acknowledged by the European Court
of Human Rights when it was confronted with a case of a
visitor to the UK (from outside the EU) whose permission to
remain had expired. She was diagnosed with HIV and was
receiving care in the UK during her stay. She argued that she
should be entitled to remain in the UK order to continue her
care within the NHS because adequate treatment would not
be provided in her home country. The Court said no such posi-
tive right existed to the ﬁnite resources of a state’s health care
system under the European Convention on Human Rights. It
said:
“Although many  of the rights it contains have implications
of a social or economic nature, the Convention is essentially
directed at the protection of civil and political rights. Further-
more,  inherent in the whole of the Convention is a search for
a fair balance between the demands of the general interest of
the community and the requirements of the protection of the
individual’s fundamental rights.”c
Subject to having fair and reasonable systems for doing so,
the proper place for balancing these interests was the con-
tracting state itself, not an international court.
Rights  –  substantive,  or  procedural?
How, and to whom, should a public welfare system be held
accountable? As we  have noted, matters involving the distri-
bution of social and economic rights in society are generally
more  amenable to democratic accountability through par-
liament than judicial arbitration. Nevertheless, to say that
positive rights are “political” is not to say that the courts have
no role to play. If we accept that social and economic rights
create a different dimension of difﬁculty in respect of their
enforcement, how can we preserve a system of judicial super-c N v United Kingdom (2008) (App no. 26565/05). On the need for
fair  and reasonable resource allocation systems, see also Van Kuck
v  Germany (2003) (App no 35968/97).
b l i c a
ity in a male to female procedure. However, the claimant was
not content with her absence of breast tissue and sought fur-
ther funding for prosthetic breast implants. This request was154  r e v p o r t s a ú d e p ú 
political recognition, yet placing the supervision of claims in
the hands of the courts. How do rights work in these cases?
Because the duty is imposed on the public authority by
statute, procedural rights normally lead only to judicial review
capable of referring the decision back to the decision-maker
to be reconsidered and re-taken in the light of the courts crit-
icism. This must follow because the priorities identiﬁed in
health care are matters of judgement for the public author-
ity. NHS “commissioning” involves an inﬁnite combination of
polycentric trade-offs which require the exercise of discretion
and about which there will be different views. For example,
imagine we  are commissioners with statutory duties to pro-
mote the health of a community of people. We  know that
elderly and disabled patients often receive less care than they
need and that acute treatments grab bigger headlines in the
media than long-term, chronic conditions. Should we  seek to
promote long-term objectives, e.g. to reduce obesity and coro-
nary heart disease, knowing this may take years to generate
results? Or should we  focus on improving the survival rates
of pre-term babies today by refurbishing the neonatal wards?
Should neonatal care receive proportionately more funding
than paediatric care, obstetric, or cancer care? Should we  dis-
invest from acute care in hospitals to give greater support
to community nurses dealing with chronic illnesses (such as
heart disease, cerebro-vascular disease and arthritis)? Should
we spend more  on cancer drugs, or palliative care for can-
cer patients, or treatment for mental illness? Knowing we
cannot do all these things, how should we  prioritise? This
acknowledges the complex nature of decision-making involv-
ing medicine, economics, social policy and politics. Judges
have no special expertise in the substantive aspects of this
area. Their role is to ensure that the process by which deci-
sions have been made is robust and defensible. In this way, the
courts should be able to give proper expression to procedural
rights.
B.  Accountability  for  rationing  –  the  concepts
in practice
How do these broad conceptual distinctions work in practice in
the NHS? We  discuss (1) judicial review and negligence, (2) pro-
cedural remedies, (3) the NHS Constitution and (4) exceptional
substantive remedies.
Judicial  review,  or  negligence?
First let us distinguish actions in medical negligence and judi-
cial review. Negligence applies when clinicians are careless in
the standard of treatment given to patients and cause dam-
age. Negligence gives rise to a private action in which the
patient’s claim for damages is not affected by the impact of
the claim on others. (This is so even though the damages are
paid from the public authority’s ﬁnite budget and will reduce
the sums available to fulﬁl its public duties.) By contrast, judi-
cial review is a public action against a public authority to
review whether it has complied with the duties imposed upon
it by statute, bearing in mind the ﬂexibility permitted by the
discretion discussed above. Judicial review may be taken on . 2 0 1 4;3 2(2):151–157
one (or more)  of the three grounds, i.e. that the decision was
(a) illegal (for being ultra vires or otherwise contrary to law),
(b) irrational (for taking into account irrelevant factors, ignor-
ing relevant ones, or giving them disproportionate weight),
and (c) procedurally improper (for failing to follow the proce-
dures set down in the statute, or giving the claimant proper
grounds to be heard under the rules of natural justice). (There
are overlaps between each remedy and the same complaint
may provoke all three actions.) The remedy is not normally
damages. Instead, the claimant seeks an order to overturn (or,
“quash”, but not reverse) the public authority’s decision so that
it is referred back to the decision-maker to be taken again. In
legal theory, the decision-maker can come to the same deci-
sion again, provided the reasoning process is reviewed and
repaired as suggested by the court. In practice, however, public
authorities which fail to defend themselves in judicial review
do not normally persevere with the same decision. Instead,
they concede the claim and accommodate the demands made
upon them.
As we have noted, the NHS in England is governed by the
National Health Service Act 2006 which imposes on the Sec-
retary of State a duty to promote a comprehensive health
service. In turn, this duty is delegated to over 200 NHS commis-
sioners responsible for promoting the care of the populations
they serve. For this reason, most of the judicial review actions
claiming access to NHS resources are brought against commis-
sioners. The courts have developed a procedural remedy for
“positive rights” actions of this nature, although substantive
remedies are also available exceptionally.
Procedural  remedy
Clearly, then, judicial review normally provides a procedural
remedy. For example, in cases seeking access to health treat-
ment, the court will test whether the decision is robust and
can withstand logical scrutiny. Generalised rights to health
care are sometimes called “target” duties which provide pro-
cedural remedies only. In one case, applicants for transgender
surgery were refused access to treatment because evidence of
the effectiveness of the treatment was not conﬁrmed by ran-
domised controlled trials. The court quashed the decision. The
numbers seeking transgender surgery is still relatively small.
It was irrational to demand that a treatment administered to
so few could be assessed by trials involving many  patients.
Instead, the health authority should have assessed the rea-
soning of the doctors in the case.d The health authority was
not duty-bound to do what the doctors advised, but if it wished
to depart from their advice, it had to have good reasons and
be able to explain why. The decision was referred back to be
taken again (after which the health authority reversed its deci-
sion and funded the treatment). On the other hand, in another
case, transgender surgery was funded by the health author-d See R v North West Lancashire Health Authority, ex p A, D & G [1999]
Lloyds Rep Med 399.
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ejected on the ground that the health authority normally
efused “cosmetic” surgery because it was considered to be
 low priority for NHS funding. The health authority reasoned
hat it would be unfair to other women who sought fund-
ng for a similar procedure to authorise payment for cosmetic
urgery for transgender patients alone. The court agreed with
he reasoning of the health authority and refused the claim.e
A subtle matter of judicial politics is raised in respect of this
rocedural remedy. The question arises in connection with
he intensity of the court’s review. For many  years before the
id-1990s, the style of judicial review in the UK was essen-
ially passive and deferential. The extent of “trust” between
he judiciary and executive was such that the norms of pub-
ic authority “accountability” we  take for granted today were
eak. In a notorious case in 1988, a four-year old boy needed
ole in the heart surgery and was placed at the top of his doc-
or’s list of clinical priorities. Yet his surgery was cancelled
wice by the hospital managers and his health was put in dan-
er. The reason for the delay was a shortage of intensive care
aediatric nurses. A claim for judicial review requested that
he court order that the operation be performed. However, the
ourt refused the application saying that it had no authority or
xpertise to manage the hospital’s waiting lists.f The boy died
oon afterwards. The awful thing about this approach is the
ailure of the court to ask “why?” Why was a patient with such
rgent need and clinical merit denied treatment? Even if there
ere nursing shortages, why was the boy not transferred to
nother hospital for treatment? This “passive” judicial review
ay be criticised for offering only a sham appearance of a
right”. Had the question been asked in this case, an appropri-
te clinical solution would surely have been found. By today’s
tandards, in which scrutiny is the norm, the courts passivity
as unwarranted.
However, if this is too weak, there may also be an equal
isk in the opposite direction if judicial review is too intense.
ear in mind the purpose of judicial review is often to review
he internal logic of a decision, the factors that have been con-
idered and the proportionate weight allocated to each. In the
ature of things, decisions may have to be taken in haste and,
n hindsight, reasoning adopted yesterday could sometimes be
mproved today if everything was reconsidered afresh, espe-
ially under a bright forensic spotlight. If judicial review is
ntolerant of every slip in the process so that it would be rare
or such a case to fail, then it effectively becomes a substan-
ive remedy. This may be good for the individual applicants
ho  succeed in achieving access to treatment, but what about
he many  others whose access to care is delayed, diluted,
r denied as a consequence; and whose circumstances were
ever brought to the court’s attention?
So there is a danger that over-enthusiastic courts may ter-
orise health authorities into conceding every claim made
gainst them and of effectively favouring the “litigating”
lasses. Those that suffer as a result are often the less articu-
ate elderly, mentally ill and disadvantaged groups of patients.
alance is crucial so that the courts are satisﬁed that the
e AC v Berkshire West PCT and the EHRC (2010) 116 BMLR 125
afﬁrmed by CA, (2011) 119 BMLR 135 Civ 247).
f R v Central Birmingham HA, ex p Collier (1988, unreported, CA). 0 1 4;3 2(2):151–157 155
decision-making process is robust, in the sense that it can
explain the unenviable decisions it may have to make, but that
is not to say that the court will always agree with every deci-
sion or that it could never be improved upon. Such a process
has been encouraged over many  years by NHS commission-
ers in the south of England according to an Ethical Framework
within which difﬁcult decisions about particular treatments
have been taken.3 The Framework requires commissioners
to assess: (a) evidence of clinical and cost effectiveness,
(b) issues of equity, (c) patients’ needs and the capacity to
beneﬁt, (d) costs and opportunity costs, (e) needs of the com-
munity, (f) government priorities and (g) the possibility of
patients possessing exceptional circumstances. The process
enables commissioners to demonstrate decisions are fair,
transparent and consistent over time.
The Ethical Framework has been successful with respect
to decisions about individual treatments and the costs they
impose upon a limited budget during the year. But what about
larger scale strategic planning? We  have noted that public
austerity is forcing difﬁcult decisions upon government. One
response to the need to control costs is to close some hospitals
by focusing more  care in the best hospitals, but enabling larger
numbers of patients to be treated in the community, where it is
less expensive. This is government policy, but it is hugely con-
tentious. No-one welcomes the closure of a local hospital and
whenever such a measure is proposed it is met  with outcry
and proceedings in judicial review. The remedy sought is nor-
mally based on a claim of procedural impropriety, i.e. that the
procedures adopted in coming to the decision were defective
and so the decision should be taken all over again. This is ﬁne
in principle. These decisions involve extended consultation
with the public, the evidence of expert witnesses, and weigh-
ing and balancing highly detailed data. However, the docu-
mentation and process are highly complex and, in the nature
of things, a detailed critique of the process in judicial review is
likely to discover something that might have been done better.
In a recent case, the court discovered such a ﬂaw because the
“scores” a hospital had been awarded for individual aspects
of its performance by comparison to others had not been
disclosed.g But assuming that in many  such complex cases
some form of “impropriety” could be discovered if you looked
hard enough, the courts could effectively block legitimate gov-
ernment policy in respect of NHS hospitals. This would surely
take the courts outside their legitimate area of competence
and trespass into an area of politics in which they have no
business. It is another example of an apparently procedural
remedy having a substantive impact and demonstrates the dif-
ﬁculty of extending ethical frameworks to strategic planning
at national level. There should come a stage when the political
component of the decision is more  dominant than the ethics.
The  NHS  constitutionThe need for balance between the individual, the community
and the state is recognised by the English NHS in the NHS
g Save Our Surgery Ltd, R (on the application of) v Joint Com-
mittee of Primary Care Trusts [2013] EWHC 439 (Admin) (07 March
2013).
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Constitution,4 which is effectively a bill of rights for patients and
those working in the NHS. The NHS Constitution recognises all
the rights we  have discussed above and imposes an obligation
on commissioners to promote fairness and transparency in
decision-making.h Thus, although it does not create any new
substantive rights, it requires each commissioner to publish
a document explaining how it has made decisions to pri-
oritise its resources, and with respect to individual patients,
why a treatment decision has been made in their particular
case. In addition, consistent with previous case-law, it requires
commissioners to have a review process capable of accom-
modating patients who  believe that their circumstances are
sufﬁciently “exceptional” to justify their receiving treatment
so that the merits of such a claim can be considered. “Excep-
tionality” will present difﬁculty because the clinical evidence
to support such a case will often be equivocal and the costs of
admitting too many  will be unaffordable.
NHS Constitution rights are recognised by statutei and,
consistent with judicial review, give applicants procedural
rights in the sense that a failure to comply would enable the
court to overturn the decision and refer it back to the decision-
maker, or to insist that proper, transparent procedures are
introduced in respect of health care priority setting (e.g. anal-
ogous to those contained in the Ethical Framework, discussed
above).
Exceptional  substantive  remedies
Although the usual remedies in judicial review are procedural,
substantive rights are available in a number of speciﬁc circum-
stances as exceptions to the general rule. First, if a statute
confers particular substantive rights, then the judicial review
court will provide a substantive remedy to enforce it. The
most obvious cases concern speciﬁc entitlements to statutory
ﬁnancial beneﬁt (e.g. speciﬁc pension, or welfare payments).
However, a comparable case has also arisen with respect to
the rights to liberty of mental health patients. Compulso-
rily detained patients have the right to have the lawfulness
of their detention reviewed periodically by a Mental Health
Review Tribunal established by statute for the purpose. Where
a statute provided a speciﬁc time frame within which such a
review should occur, it was not satisfactory for the Secretary
of State to say that he had not appointed sufﬁcient members
of Tribunals to fulﬁl the duty. The case involved fundamental
issues of the liberty of an individual (a negative right) who
was subject to compulsory detention. The public authority
was under a substantive duty to ensure the right to periodic
review was exercised according to the time speciﬁed in the
statutory regulations.j The claimant was, therefore, entitled
h See the National Health Service Commissioning Board and
Clinical Commissioning Groups (Responsibilities and Standing
Rules) Regulations 2012, SI 2012, No 2996, Part 7.
i See the Health and Social Care Act 2012 and the National Health
Service Commissioning Board and Clinical Commissioning Groups
(Responsibilities and Standing Rules) Regulations 2012, SI 2012, No
2996.
j R (KB) v MHRT and Secretary of State for Health [2002] EWHC
639; Tomlinson v Birmingham City Council [2010] UKSC 8. . 2 0 1 4;3 2(2):151–157
to enforce his statutory right to have the lawfulness of his
detention reviewed.
Second, even with respect to generalised or “target” rights,
entitlements may become enforceable in the most extreme
circumstances of personal hardship. In one case, an applicant
for political asylum in the UK was forbidden by statute from
taking paid work, or from claiming welfare beneﬁt during the
time the application was being considered. The applicant was
reduced to living in the street in penury with no means of
access to food or shelter. The House of Lords held that this was
a breach of his human rights for being inhuman and degrad-
ing and that he was entitled to subsistence. In another case,
a terminally ill man  suffering HIV/AIDS was to be deported
from the UK. His condition was being controlled in the UK.
However were he to be deported, he would not have access to
treatment during the period of time required to establish his
health care rights in his native country (Portugal). This, the
court said, would expose him to inhuman and degrading treat-
ment contrary to his rights under the European Convention on
Human Rights.k
Third, the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence
(NICE) is a statutory body created to advise health authori-
ties as to the costs and beneﬁts of medicines. It may publish
technology appraisal guidance (TAG) in respect of a particular
medical technology (i.e. medicine, or other pharmaceutical
technology). TAGs have been given mandatory force under
statutory regulations so that health authorities are duty-
bound to fund the costs of TAGs within three months of the
guidance being published if the treatment has been prescribed
by a patient’s doctor.5 No case has yet challenged a health
authority for refusing to fund the costs of a TAG. However, the
prospects of success in judicial review would be good on
the ground of illegality, i.e. that the authority had failed to
comply with its statutory duty to support the costs of such
care. In this case, the court would be entitled to award a sub-
stantive remedy by ordering that it do so.
Fourth, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and
European Court of Justice (ECJ) have also become involved
in cases of this nature. The approach of the ECHR has been
comparable to that adopted in judicial review, i.e. that every
decision of this kind potentially involves sensitive issues of
priority setting and opportunity costs and that these are better
taken within the jurisdictions concerned, rather than a remote
court sitting in Strasbourg.l However, the European Court of
Justice has taken a different view and insisted that patients
generally have substantive rights to the health they need. If
it cannot be provided within a reasonable time at home, then
mpatients have a public right to obtain it elsewhere in the EU.
This is attractive from an “individual” perspective, but given
the factors we have considered above, in terms of the need
k R (Limbuela) v Secretary of State for the Home Department
[2007] 1 All ER 951 and R (Almeida) v Kensington and Chelsea
BC (2012) 127 BMLR 82. Note the difference between these cases
and N v United Kingdom (2008) (App no. 26565/05), discussed
above, where treatment was denied because the patient was not
in  extremis. The distinction between these cases is not wholly
convincing.
l Pentiacova v Moldova (2005) 40 EHRR 209.
m R (Watts) v Bedfordshire PCT Case (2006) ECJ, C-372/04.
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o set priorities and have regard to the impact of spending
olicies on the community as a whole, it has obvious fund-
ng implications and the rights of patients at home. Oddly, the
CJ has never explained the reason for this conclusion. It is
tated as a “fact” of EU law ﬂowing from the right to freedom of
ovement  of services between the member states. The Court
as not clearly discussed the opportunity costs arising from
ts judgments, especially on those who are too ill, elderly, or
isabled to take the beneﬁt of the right. Given the uncertainty
his has created, the European Commission has passed a com-
lex Directive on Patient Mobility which seeks to balance the
individualistic” approach of the ECJ with the communitar-
an way in which European health care systems are funded.6
e  await to see how the balance between these sometimes
ncompatible objectives is achieved.
onclusion
ealth care resource allocation, the prioritising of patents’
ights, is inherently a political question. How should the
argesse available to government be distributed amongst its
itizens? Arguments about social and economic rights involve
ssues of politics, economics, morality, ethics and so on. In this
rena, we  require different mechanisms to resolve disputes.
hey involve competing claims between individuals and have
onsequences for others very different from private rights. We
ave discussed the extent to which law should be involved in
olitical disputes of this nature. We  have seen the UK response
n judicial review is to have developed a particular notion of
procedural” rights. Procedural rights are certainly rights and
arry their own speciﬁc legal remedies. They impose duties on
ommissioners to consider relevant information openly, fairly
nd consistently. Procedural rights have the beneﬁt of enabling
he courts to detach themselves from the “politics” of deciding
hich group of patients, or which treatments, should take pri-
rity over others in the competition for socio-economic rights.
We have also noted, however, that the precise dividing line
etween procedural and substantive rights is often blurred.
udges are human and will sympathise with many  of the
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claims that come before them. Unsurprisingly, they may ﬁnd
ways of imposing procedural pressures on decision-makers
which effectively create a substantive remedy. To some extent
this is inevitable and we are familiar with the debate about
the proper role of judges. Equally, in times of welfare auster-
ity, when difﬁcult decisions are forced upon us, courts must
respect decisions which reﬂect government policy. Judges are
well-equipped to adjudicate over claims involving individuals
alone. However, issues of health care rights involve commu-
nity substantive interests and the rights of those unknown to
the courts. This requires a different approach based on pro-
cedural principles of transparency, equality and consistency.
Unless we are clear about the distinction, claims to public wel-
fare are likely to undermine the interests of the most poorly
represented groups whose rights are most in need of protec-
tion.
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